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NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS: JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF THE NRC's DUTY TO ISSUE
A HEALTH WARNING
I. Introduction
The increased release of carcinogens and toxins into the environment has resulted in much controversy over the long term effects
on public health from breathing, ingesting and absorbing these
substances.' This controversy is demonstrated by the recent litigation over DES, asbestos, 8 atomic blasts, nerve gas 5 and nuclear
power." The injunctive relief sought in these actions has ranged
from warnings' and abatement orders 8 to the closing of facilities
which emit toxins.9
Radiation hazards, particularly the long term health effects of
low level radiation, have generated much concern. 10 Litigation in
this area has centered on the planning and construction of nuclear
power plants." Due to the risks and benefits inherent in the use of
nuclear power, proponents advocate the construction of these
plants because of society's energy needs12 while opponents argue
against their construction because of the dangers posed to public
health by radiation emissions.1 s
4
As a result of the Three Mile Island nuclear power accident,
1. See generally Kraus, Environmental CarcenogenesisRegulation on the Frontiers of
Science, 7 ENVT'L L. 83 (1976).
2..See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
3. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th
Cir. 1975).
4. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961
(1979).
5. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, No. 79-381 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, MD L No. 381.
6. See notes 59 and 158 infra.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. See, e.g., Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Reserve Mining Company v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975);
Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. 414, 419 (M.D. Tenn, 1979).
10. See note 32 infra.
11. See notes 103-09 infra and accompanying text.
12. See note 111 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 103-09 infra. See also note 32 infra.
14. See section II infra.
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the theoretical battles over nuclear power production crystalized in
Johnsrud V. Carter.'" Section II of this Comment analyzes the
Johnsrud issue: whether residents living near the Three Mile Island facility were entitled to a health warning as a minimum precautionary measure because of the uncertain amount of radiation
emitted as a result of the accident. 6 In Johnsrud, the plaintiffs
requested that the president of the United States be held responsi17
ble for the issuance of such a warning.
This Comment proposes that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") is the proper defendant in a suit which requests
such a health warning. A brief analysis of the history and functions
of the NRC in section III supports this conclusion. Thereafter, two
issues concerning judicial review of the NRC will be discussed in
sections IV and V respectively. Section IV will analyze whether the
issuance of a health warning is a nondiscretionary duty of the
NRC, or a matter, the determination of which, is within the
agency's discretion. 8 This analysis will determine the scope of the
court's review over an action requesting the NRC to issue a health
warning.19 Section V will discuss whether a district court or a court
of appeals is the appropriate forum in which to bring such an action, assuming the NRC is the proper defendant.2 0
15. No. 79-1950 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 1980).
16. Id., slip op. at 3.
17. Id.
18. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a person who has suffered a legal
wrong or who has been adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action is entitled to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The only exceptions are where there is a statutory prohibition on review or where agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1976).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) (Scope of Review) provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of a
statutory right
20. Pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 301 (g), 88
Stat. 1233, the NRC is subject to the judicial review provisions provided in part by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2231, 2239 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1976).
The 1954 Act provides for both district court review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1976)
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II. Johnsrud v. Carter
On March 28, 1979, the United States experienced the "worst
accident" in the history of nuclear power generation,"1 when the
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, located near Middletown,
Pennsylvania, sustained a mechanical malfunction" after several
water pumps stopped working.23 Thereafter, a series of events"
"compounded by equipment failures, inappropriate procedures,
and human errors and ignorance"2 5 escalated the crises. For the
people living in the communities surrounding Three Mile Island,
"the rumors, conflicting official statements, a lack of knowledge
about radiation releases, the continuing possibility of mass evacuation, and the fear that a hydrogen bubble trapped2 inside a nuclear
reactor might explode were real and immediate.

0

and appellate court review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1976) provides, in part:
The provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 and chapter 7, of title 5 shall apply to
all agency action taken under this chapter, and the terms "agency" and "agency action" shall have the meaning specified in section 551 of title 5 . ...
42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976) provides, in part:
(a) In any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or
amending of any license or construction permit, or application to transfer control,
and in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees, ...
(b) Any final order entered in any proceeding of the kind specified in subsection (a)
of this section shall be subject to judicial review in the manner prescribed in chapter
158 of title 28 and to the provisions of chapter 7 of title 5.
See Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1214 (D. Colo. 1970).
21. KEMENY, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, at
1 (reprinted by Pergamon Press 1979) [hereinafter cited as THE COMMISSION'S REPORT].
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 81.
24. Id. For a detailed account of the accident, see THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note
21, at 81-141; OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARCH 28, 1979 THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT no. 50-320/79-10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as INVESTIGATION INTO TMI
ACCIDENT].

25. THE COMMISSSON's REPORT, supra note 21, at 81.
26. Id. Theodore Gross, provost of the Capitol Campus of Pennsylvania State University, commented:
Never before have people been asked to live with such ambiguity. The TMI [Three
Mile Island] accident-an accident we cannot see or taste or smell . . .is an accident
that is invisible. I think the fact that it is invisible creates a sense of uncertainty and
fright on the part of people that may well go beyond the reality of the accident itself.
THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 81.

356

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

As a result of the accident, Johnsrud v. Carter,27 a class action
complaint, was filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on March 30, 1979.28 The plain-

tiffs requested the United States to order an evacuation of all persons within a specified distance from the Three Mile Island facility.2 9 On'April 19, 1979, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint 0

seeking mandatory injunctive relief31 which requested the United
States and President Carter to issue a public warning to each resident within 200 miles of Three Mile Island:
Of the fact that they have an increased risk of injury to health and reproductive capabilities by virtue of having been exposed to, being exposed to
and continuing to be exposed to manmade radiation added to the natural
background radiation by leakage of radioactive material from Three Mile
Island and by direct radiation emanating from the containment building.32
27. No. 79-1950, (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 1980).
28. Id., slip op. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2.
32. Id. at 3. THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 21, stated "that the actual release [of
radiation at TMI] will have a negligible effect on the physical health of individuals." Id. at
12. See The Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Transcript of Proceedings Before The
Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 142-46
(April 4, 1979). [hereinafter cited as Proceedings Before The Subcommittee on Health and
Scientific Research.] However, THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 21, admits that the
health effects of low-level radiation are unknown and that the degree of danger from such
doses can only be measured indirectly. Id. at 12, 35. Yet, the report concluded that the
radiation doses (at TMI) were so low "that the overall health effects will be minimal." Id. at
12. Furthermore, "although a site emergency was declared at 0654 (on March 28), the first
environmental radiation survey was not performed until 0748." INVESTIGATION INTO TMI
ACCIDENT, supra note 24, at 11-3-77. There were also reports of deficiencies (either due to
mechanical malfunctions or operator misjudgments) and omissions in monitoring "in-plant"
and "off-site" radiation leakage. THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 21, at 34, 101-07.
See INVESTIGATIONS INTO TMI, supra note 24, at 11-1-35, 36, 43-6, 11-3-5, 6, 10, 18, 41, 84,
90, 94, 97; Proceedings Before The Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research,
supra, at 31, 34; Accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Oversight
Hearings]. However, THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, surpa note 21, concluded: "these deficiencies did not affect the commission staff's ability to estimate the radiation doses on health
effects resulting from the accident." Id. at 34. Accord, INVESTIGATION INTO TMI, supra note
24, at 11-3-98, 99.
Essentially, the plaintiff's requested warning would acknowledge the uncertainty associated with the accrual effects of low-level radiation on public health and safety, particularly
when there are monitoring deficiencies during the incident.
It should be noted that if the plaintiffs reworded the first line of the requested warning
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The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the action was barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that the case presented a
non-justiciable political question.3
The Third Circuit, relying on its decision in Jaffee v. United
States,34 held that the district court did have jurisdiction over the
from "of the fact that they have an increased risk of injury to health. . ." to "of the fact
that they may have an increased risk of injury to health .. " then their request may be
viewed more favorably because the warning would then acknowledge that there are differing
views on health effects associated with low-level radiation, i.e. that there is uncertainty. For
general discussions for and against the hazards of radiation see Yellin, JudicialReview and
Nuclear Power: Assessing the Risks of Environmental Catastrophe,45 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
969 (1979); Comment The Energy Crisis:Reasonable Assurances of Safety in the Regulation of Nuclear Power Facilities,55 J. Uiw. L. 371 (1978); Poulin, Who Controls Low-Level
Radioactive Wastes, 6 Emrw'L Air. 201 (1977).
There are also numerous scientific discussions on the health effects from varying doses of
radiation which offer more detailed information. See, e.g., Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, The Effects on Populationsof Exposure to Low Levels
of Ionizing Radiation, Division of Medical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Washington D.C. (Nov. 1972); Baino and Fraser, A Case Study
Multiple Low Level Exposure to Plutonium Oxide, 34 HEALTH PHYSICS 649 (June 1978);
Bogen, French and Krey, Plutonium in Man and His Environment, 195 NATURE 263 (July
1962); Brues, Finkel, and Lisco, CarcinogenicProperties of Radioactive Fission Products
and of Plutonium, 49 RADIOLOGY 361 (1947); Cardozo, The Dispersal of RadioactiveMatter
By Evaporation, 25 HEAmT PHYSICS 593 (Dec. 1973); Edsall, Toxicity of Plutonium and
Some Other Actinides, BULLETIN oF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, (Sept. 1976); Geiger and Win-

sor, 239 Pu Contamination in Snakes Inhabiting the Rocky Flats Plant Site, 33 HEALTH
PHYSICS 145 (Aug. 1977); Gofman and Tamplin, Epidemiologic Studies of Carcinogenesis
By Ionizing Radiation, Procedings of the Sixth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical
Statistics and Probability, (July 1971); Gofman and Tamplin, Low-Dose Radiation and
Cancer, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Transactions on Nuclear Science,
NS-17, No. 1, 1-9 (Feb. 1970); Gofman, The Cancer Hazard From Inhaled Plutonium, Committee For Nuclear Responsibility, 1975-1-R (May 14, 1975); Gofman, The Plutonium Controversy, 236 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 284 (July 1976); Hirsh and Rice, Status and Future Prospects for Fusion Power, Procedings of the 5th International Congress of Radiation Research
Seattle, RADIATION RESEARCH 42 (1974); Inoue, Kato, Morisawa and Wadachi, Radiological

Safety Assessment For A Low-Level Radioactive Solid Waste Storage Facility:Preliminary
Risk Evaluation By Reliability Techniques, 35 HEALTH PHYSICS 817 (1978).
33. Id. See Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1185, slip op. at 4-6 (E.D. Pa., May 18, 1979).
34. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). In Johnsrud v. Carter, No.
79-1950 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 1980), the Third Circuit court stated:
In Jaffee, we considered application of the sovereign immunity doctrine in an action
which sought, inter alia, a warning from the United States to servicemen who had

participated in atomic bomb tests in the Nevada desert, notifying them of the potential health dangers which might develop from radiation exposure during these tests.
We held that, in an equitable action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) seeking "nonstatutory" review of agency action, the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1976), serves as a waiver of United States sovereign immunity. Id. slip
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Johnsrud action pursuant to section 1331, Title 28 United States
Code ("section 1331").85 The court stated that the district court
had jurisdiction for two related reasons. First, the plaintiffs had
alleged a violation of their rights under federal constitutional, stat3 Second, in an equitable action under
utory, and common law.8
section 1331 seeking "non-statutory" review, the Administrative
Procedure Act 7 ("APA") serves to waive the defendant's sovereign
immunity.5 5 Since the district court's jurisdiction depended in part
op. at 4-5.
In explanation of this statement the court further stated:
[n]on-statutory suits for review are so described because they are not brought under
statutes that specifically provide for review of agency action. Indeed review, if available at all, is through actions involving matters which arise under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ...
Id. at 4 n.3. See notes 37, 38 infra and accompanying text.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States except that no
such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United
States, any agency thereof, or an officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
36. Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1950, slip op. at 5 n.6 (3d Cir. April 23, 1980). The District Court in Johnsrud summarized:
The plaintiffs contentions to be that the radiation which is released into the environment by Metropolitan Edison Power Co., the plant operator, will cause them to suffer
irreparable harm in violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed under the First,
Fourth, and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Further, the
plaintiffs assert that the exposure to radiation violates their statutory and civil rights
granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1185, slip op. at 1, 2 (E.D. Pa., May 18, 1979).
The complaint also alleged that the government's purported duty to issue the requested
warning "arises in part under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2011 et. seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder." Johnsrud v. Carter,
No. 79-1950, slip op. at 5 n.6. It is not within the scope of this Comment to discuss the
plaintiff's federal constitutional, statutory and common law claims.
37. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976). Specifically 5 U.S.C. § 702 states:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to
judicial review thereof.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) further provides:
An action in a court of the United States seeking other than money damages and
stating a claim that an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official
capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein
denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is
an indispensible party . . .
For discussions of the partial elimination of sovereign immunity as a barrier to nonstatutory review of federal administrative action in suits seeking equitable relief under 28
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on the utilization of the APA, the defendant in Johnsrud necessarily had to be an agency. Therefore, as the court noted, it is an
open question whether the President of the United States is an
agency within the meaning of the APA.3 9 Accordingly, the court
suggested that the plaintiffs may wish to specifically designate a
responsible agency and amend their complaint. 40 Thus, it may be
in the plaintiffs' best interests to specifically name a responsible
federal agency to ensure that
nothing deters the court from reach4
'
suit.
the
of
merits
ing the
U.S.C. § 1331 see H. R. REP. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS at 6121; Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Watson's Estate v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978);
Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1978); Springdale Convalescent Center v. Mathews, 545 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1977); Banker's Live v. Callaway, 530 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1976); Scott v. Hoffmann, 425 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. I1. 1979).
39. Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1950, slip op. at 7 n.8.
5 U.S.C. § 551 (1) (1976) provides:
(1) "agency" means each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia;
(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives
of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them;
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied
territory; or
(H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739, 1743, and 1744 of title 12;
chapter 2 of title 41; or sections 1622, 1884, 1891-1902, and former section 1641
(b)(2), of title 50, appendix.
See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The statutory definition of
'agency' specifically excludes Congress and the courts of the United States, but does not
specifically exclude the President.
...); Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 761 (D.D.C. 1971) ("The leading students of the APA
whose analyses are often cited by the Supreme Court, and who, on some matters are in
conflict which each other, seem to be in agreement that the term 'agency' in the APA includes the President-a conclusion fortified by the care taken to express exclusion of 'Congress' and 'the courts'. But we need not consider whether an action for judicial review can
be brought against the President eo nomine."); K. DAVIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1.2
at 4-5 (1978). See, e.g., Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 58 (D.D.C. 1973).
40. Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1950, slip op. at 7 n.8.
41. To assure clear definition of the particular individuals who will be personally responsible for compliance with a court's mandatory or injunctive decree, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)
provides in part:
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III. The NRC Is The Proper Defendant In A Suit
Requesting A Health Warning
A brief analysis of the NRC's role in the nuclear industry will
demonstrate that there are several reasons why the NRC is the
federal agency that should be responsible for issuing a health
warning. First, the Energy Reorganization Act 42 gives the NRC extensive regulatory duties under the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA") in
connection with the licensing of nuclear facilities and controlling
uses of source, by-product and special nuclear materials.' 8 Second,
The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment
or decree may be entered against the United States: Provided that any mandatory or
injunctive decree shall specify the federal officer or officers (by name or title), and
their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in U. S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6132.

Thus, if the court decides either that the president is not an agency within the meaning of
Section 702, Title 5 of the United States Code ("Section 702") or that the president as an
agency is not the proper party to issue a warning, the plaintiffs should already have safeguarded their interests by having designated, in addition to the president, an existing federal agency responsible for nuclear radiation safety. Furthermore, the plaintiffs must specify
the officer or officers of that agency who could be responsible to issue a warning.
Even if the plaintiff's fail to amend their complaint to name another agency, one could
interpret section 702 as standing for the proposition that the court may in its discretion
name the appropriate agency to implement its decree, particularly in light of the extraordinary circumstances of the instant case. Section 702 states that an action may be commenced
by naming the United States and that only the court's decree must specify the federal officers involved. Because a decree by the court would come after its review of the merits of
the case, the court would be in as good a position as the plaintiffs to name the appropriate
agency. See Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d. 712, 720 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961
(1979).

42. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1976)). In
discussing the Atomic Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 the Supreme Court has stated:
"Since 1946, when the first Atomic Energy Act was passed, 60 Stat. 755, the Federal Government has exercised control over the production and use of atomic energy through the
AEC [Atomic Energy Commission]-replaced ... by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)." Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 5 (1975). "Under the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 et. seq. (1970 Supp. IV), the licensing and
related regulatory functions of the AEC were transferred to the NRC; the ERDA assumed
responsibility for the operation of Government nuclear research and production facilities."
(footnotes omitted). Id. at 2 n.1.
43. "The comprehensive regulatory scheme created by the AEA [Atomic Energy Act]
embraces the production, possession, and use of three types of radioactive materials-source
material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material." Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest
Research Group, 426 U.S. at 5-6.
"The term 'by-product material' means (1) any radioactive material (except special nu-
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although other agencies play a role in regulating radiation, the
NRC is the prime federal regulator of nuclear radiation."" Finally,
the AEA mandates that the NRC license and regulate nuclear fa45
cilities in a manner that will protect public health and safety.
The report of the President's Commission on Three Mile Island
stressed that safety from radiation hazards is one of the NRC's
primary functions."' The report criticized the NRC for overlooking
its safety activities while emphasizing its regulatory role. 7 The
Commission's report and the hearings on Three Mile Island before
the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment 4" both
show that the NRC was deficient in protecting public safety."a
These reports and hearings, rather than refute the contention that
the NRC should have issued a health warning, support it by emphasizing the need for an internal restructuring of the NRC to ensure that the agency attends to radiation safety. 0 Therefore, one
way of ensuring that the NRC carries out "its primary mission of
assuring safety" 1 is to name the NRC as the proper agency to be
clear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the
process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed
primarily for its source material content." Pub. L. No. 95-604, Title I, § 201, 92 Stat. 3033
(1978) 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (Supp. 1980). "The term 'source material' means (1) uranium,
thorium or any other material which is determined by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Section 2091 of this title to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more
of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the Commission may by regulation determine from time to time." 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (z) (1976).
The term 'special nuclear material' means (1) plutonium, uranium, enriched in the
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2071 of this title, determines to be special nuclear
material, but does not include source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source material.
42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1976)
44. For a detailed discussion on the interrelation of federal agencies in setting radiation
standards and controls see Hallmark, Radiation ProtectionStandards and the Administrative Decision-Making Process, 8 ENVT'L L. 785, 789-90 (1978); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1975).
45. See notes 57, 59 infra and accompanying text.
46. THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 21, at 19.
47. Id. at 19-21.
48. See generally Oversight Hearings, supra note 32.
49.

50.
51.

Id. See THE COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 21.
THE COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 21, at 22.
See note 41 supra.
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charged with a duty to warn. 2
IV.

A Health Warning: Discretionary Matter or NonDiscretionary Duty?

The APA generally provides that a person who has suffered a
legal wrong or who has been adversly affected or aggrieved by a
federal administrative agency's action is entitled to judicial review.53 However, there are two exceptions to this provision. One is
when agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. The
54
other exception is when a statute prohibits review.
Agency action is committed to agency discretion only in rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that the
agency is given absolute discretion, so that, in effect there is no law
which governs the agency's actions. 5 Where a statute gives an

agency limited discretion, however, a court may review the
agency's decision, to determine whether it is arbitrary and capri-

cious.58 The mandate "to protect the health and safety of the public" 5 is found in sections of the AEA that pertain to the regulatory
52. In this respect, a warning may mitigate damage awards in future liability suits. See
Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, No. 79-381, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1979). However, since the AEA
already provides for limited liability in the event of a nuclear accident, 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1976), a reasoned view is that a warning will aid those who will either recover a fraction of
their total damages or none at all. See Galiette, The Price Anderson Act: A Constitutional
Dilemma, 6 ENVT'L AFFAIRS 565 (1978); Note, Nuclear Power and the Price Anderson Act:
Promotion Over Public Protection, 30 STAN. L. REV. 393 (1978).
However, a warning may prove harmful to individuals with cancer-phobia. See Ferrara v.
Galuchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
53. See note 18 supra.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976) states in pertinent part:
(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
55. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); City
and County of San Francisco v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
aff'd, 615 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1980); Nuclear Data, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 344 F.
Supp 719, 725 (N.D. I1. 1972).
56. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); Izaak
Walton League of America v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 533 F.2d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976); City and County of San Francisco v. United States, 443 F.
Supp 1116, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 615 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1980); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1977).
See also note 19 supra.
57. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2051(d) (1976), 2073(b) (1976), 2098(b) (1976), 2099 (1976), 2111
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functions of an agency.58 Case law demonstrates that because of
this mandate, such functions of the NRC5s9 involve limited discretion and, therefore, may be reviewed by courts to determine
whether the NRC's decisions have been arbitrary and capricious.60
The courts are to utilize the "arbitrary and capricious" test6 ' if
they determine, that the issuance of a health warning is a regulatory function. 2 The duty to warn, however, does not arise from
(Supp. 1978), 2133(d) (1976), 2134(d) (1976), 2182 (1976), 2201(b) (1976), 2201(i) (Supp.
1978), 2232(a) (1976), 2271(a) (1976), 2280 (1976).
58. See note 57 supra.
59. The NRC's regulatory functions include licensing, inspection and enforcement decisions. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978) (review of AEC orders with respect to licensing nuclear reactors); New England Coalition On Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir.
1978) (review of NRC orders concerning proposed nuclear power plant); Virginia Elec. and
Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978) (review of an order
of NRC imposing civil penalties for making false statements in connection with application
for license to construct and operate a nuclear power plant); Izaak Walton League v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976) (review of AEC
orders which authorized permit for construction of a nuclear power plant); Citizens for Safe
Power, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (review of a final
decision and order of AEC affirming issuance of an operating license for a constructed commercial power reactor); Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (review of AEC's order denying a petition seeking a shutdown or derating of twenty
nuclear power plants); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (review of AEC's impact statement concerning an underground nuclear test); New
Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969) (review of AEC's order
refusing to consider evidence of possible thermal pollution of river as a result of the discharging of cooling water by facility of a licensee seeking permission to build a nuclear
power reactor); Cotter Corp. v. Seaborg, 370 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1966) (review of AEC regulation limiting Commission's duty to carry out its commitment to purchase uranium concentrates to those ore reserves developed prior to a certain date); Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp.
946 (D.D.C. 1973) (review of AEC decision to permit continued operation of certain reactors); Nuclear Data, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 344 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Il.1972) (review of AEC's license agreement); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970)
(review of AEC's proposed project to flare gas contained in a cavity by nuclear detonation).
60. See, e.g., New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87, 90, 91 (1st Cir. 1978); Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d
1045, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1975); New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170, 175
(1st Cir. 1969); Nuclear Data, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 344 F. Supp. 719, 726 (N.D.
I1. 1972); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1220 (D. Colo. 1970). "[Wlhen the alleged
abuse of discretion involves violation by the agency of constitutional, statutory, regulatory
or other legal mandates or restrictions," review is still possible. Ness Investment Corp. v.
United States Dep't of Agriculture Forest Serv., 512 F.2d 706, 715 (9th Cir. 1975).
61. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976). The general duties of the Commission are reflected in the
titles of the subsections in section 2201:
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allegations that an agency governed by the AEA implemented its
tasks improperly. Rather the requested relief involves the direct
relationship between the public and the NRC6 3 which arises from
the fact that the federal government has assumed sole responsibility for nuclear power plant regulation and control."
The "General Provisions" subchapter of the AEA,6" which is distinct from the sections governing an agency's regulatory functions"
makes explicit certain findings concerning the development, use,
and control of atomic energy. These Congressional findings include, inter alia, that the processing and utilization of nuclear material must be regulated to protect the health and safety of the
public.6 7 Indeed, Congress further specified that regulation of nu(a) Establishment of Advisory boards, (b) Standards governing use and possession
of material, (c) Studies and investigations, (d) Employment of personnel, (e) Acquisition of material, property . . . negotiation of commercial leases, (f) Utilization of
other federal agencies, (g) Acquisition of real and personal property, (h) Consideration of license applications, (i) Regulations governing restricted data, () Disposition
of surplus materials, (k) Carrying of firearms, . . . (m) Agreements regarding production, (n) Delegation of functions, (o) Reports, Rules and regulations, (q) Easements
for right-of-way, (r) Sales of utilities and related services, (s) Succession of Authority,
(t) Contracts, (u) Additional contracts: guiding principles; appropriations, (v) Contracts for production or enrichment of special nuclear material; domestic licenses;
other nations; prices; materials of foreign origin; criteria for availability of services
under this subsection; Congressional review; (w) License fees for nuclear power
reactors.
Transfer of functions: (a)-(d), (f), (g), (i)-(k), (n)-(q) and (s) were transferred to
and vested jointly in the NRC and the Administrator of ERDA by Energy Reorganization Act of Oct. 11, 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, which provided that
only the Administrator was to establish the basic standards and procedures respecting national security and that no functions delegated to officers of the NRC were to
include functions relating to the development of atomic energy or the atomic industry. Similar functions under subsections (h) and (w) were transferred to and vested
exclusively in the NRC.
63. Plaintiffs requesting such a warning need not allege that the NRC's and licensee's
actions in controlling the accident were inappropriate. The duty arises when the NRC becomes aware of radiological emissions. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text. See
generally Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1950 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 1980). As a minimum precautionary measure, the NRC should warn to minimize the risk of health injury to the public.
See note 32 supra; notes 71, 72, 112, 122 infra.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d)-(e) (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
65. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2021 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
66. See note 57 supra.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976) states in part:
The Congress of the United States makes the following findings concerning the development, use, and control of atomic energy:
(d) The processing and utilization of source, byproduct, and special nuclear
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clear facilities by the United States is necessary and in the national interest in order to protect the health and safety of the
public."
An examination of the act's legislative history is required to understand whether these provisions are subject to the interpretation
that Congress created the AEA, thereby monopolizing the regulation of nuclear power plants, because it felt a duty to protect the
health and safety of the public. If the existence of such a duty was
in part the motivation for enacting the AEA, then the resultant
duty created by the statute to protect the health and safety of the
public would devolve upon the governmental agencies created by
legislature pursuant to the Act."
The Senate report accompanying the 1946 Atomic Energy Act 0
found that establishing the government as the monopoly producer
of fissionable material was in part justified because the production
of such material "is attended by serious hazards to public health
and safety.

71

The report further stated that "the responsibility for

7' 2
minimizing these hazards is clearly a governmental function.
Thus, in 1946, when "the generation of useful power from atomic
energy was a distant goal,"7 the government, aware of the poten-

material must be regulated in the national interest and in order to provide for the
common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public.
[emphasis added].
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1976) provides:
Source and special nuclear material, production facilities, and utilization facilities
are affected with the public interest, and regulation by the United States of the
production and utilization of atomic energy and of the facilities used in connection
therewith is necessary in the national interest to assure the common defense and
security and to protect the health and safety of the public. [emphasis added].
69. See notes 53, 54 supra. The plaintiff's claim that the president should issue the
warning. See notes 32 and 39 supra and accompanying text. However, this Comment maintains that because the NRC is the primary federal regulator of nuclear radiation, it should
issue the warning. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
70. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 14, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976)).
71. S.REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [19461 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv.
1327-30.
72. Id.
73. S.REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3456, 3458. "It was commonly believed 8 [sic] years ago that the generation of useful
power from atomic energy was a distant goal, a very distant goal. Atomic energy then was 95
percent for military purposes, with possibly 5 percent for peacetime uses." Id. See generally
100 CONG. REC. 10368 (1954) (remarks of Rep. Hickenlooper).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

tially serious hazards associated with this form of energy, decided
to monopolize the field partly because it felt a duty to protect the
public health and safety.7
By 1954, civilian uses of atomic power had become a major industrial component of American society. 7" This expanded civilian
use of atomic power led Congress to amend the 1946 AEA. 7 The
new act reduced the government's domination of the nuclear field
by permitting private participation in the development of nuclear
power." It was believed that such participation "need not bring
with it attendant hazards to the health and safety of the American
people.

'78

This statement did not intimate that technology had ad-

vanced to the stage where health and safety hazards associated
with nuclear power could be eradicated. Read in conjunction with
the 1946 Senate report,7 the statement can be interpreted to mean
that an increased risk to the public health and safety of an already
apparent hazard would not follow from permitting private participation in the nuclear field. 0 This interpretation is bolstered by the
fact that the final 1954 AEA 81 still required federal control over
the regulation of nuclear power plants."2 Thus, the retention of
74. S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3456, 3458.
The resources of the Atomic Energy Commission and of its contractors appeared
fully adequate to develop atomic power reactors at a rate consistent with foreseeable
technical progress. Moreover, there was little experience concerning the health
hazards involved in operating atomic plants, and this fact was in itself a compelling
argument for making the manufacture and use of atomic materials a Government
monopoly. Id. [emphasis added.]
75. Id. at 3458-59. See generally 100 CONG. REc. 10368 (1954) (remarks of Rep.
Hickenlooper).
76. S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3457.
77. See The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat 919 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2096 (1976 & Supp. 1980)).
78. S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
N.ws 3456, 3458. See generally 100 CONG. REC. 10368 (1954) (remarks of Rep.
Hickenlooper).
79. S.REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.,
1327-30.
80. See generally 103 CONG. REC. 10569 (1957) (RadiationHazards In War and Peace,
remarks of Rep. Holifield); THE COMMISSIoN's REPORT, supra note 21.
81. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat., 919 (1954) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2096 (1976 & Supp. 1980)).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d)-(e) (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976); note 64 supra
and accompanying text.
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such control evidences the government's intent to maintain its
duty to protect public health and safety by minimizing the potentially serious hazards associated with atomic energy.8" Indeed, the
phrase "to protect the health and safety of the public," which 4was
used for the first time in the 1954 act, highlights this intent.1
Support for the interpretation that the administrative agencies
created under the AEA 85 retained the duty to minimize the harms
of atomic energy is found in New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy
Commission." The First Circuit, in New Hampshire, concluded
that the AEC properly refused to consider evidence of the effects
of non-radiological pollution in the planning of privately owned
and operated installations.87 Although factually the case concerned
the licensing and regulatory duties of the AEC,"8 the court felt
compelled to analyze the legislative intent supporting the AEA and
the AEC. 8 The court crystallized the agency's responsibility by
stating, "in short, we conclude that, in enacting the Atomic Energy
Acts of 1946 and 1954, in overseeing its administration, and in considering amendments, the Congress has viewed the responsibility
of the Commission as being confined to scrutiny of and protection
against hazards from radiation." 0
The First Circuit reached this conclusion after it had already
made a separate reference to the AEC's regulatory responsibilities. 1 Therefore, the statement inferentially pertains not only to
the Commission's discretionary actions in regulating nuclear power
plants but also to its direct duty to protect the public health and
safety. This is particularly so because the New Hampshire court
referred to Congress' enactment of and amendments to the Atomic
83. The words "must" and "necessary" respectively found in § 2012(d) and (e), Title 42,
United States Code demonstrate the fact that the government still took seriously it's
responsibility to minimize the public health and safety hazards associated with atomic energy. See S. REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1946) U.S. CODE CONG. SERv.
1327-30.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d)-(e) (1976). See New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406
F.2d 170, 175 (1st Cir. 1969).
85. See notes 35, 37 supra and accompanying text.
86. 406 F.2d. 170 (1st Cir. 1969).
87. Id. at 176.
88. See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
89. 406 F.2d at 174, 175.
90. Id at 175.
91. Id.
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Energy Act,92 which imply a broader scope of responsibility than
the execution of regulatory functions. Thus, because Congress intended any government body which operated under the AEA to
bear a direct protective duty to the public, the NRC has acquired
this duty."
That Congress' responsibility to the public's health and safety
was a major factor justifying the passage of the AEA,9' indicates
that in both the final 1946 act 9 5 and in the subsequent 1954
amendment" Congress intended that the government's duty to
minimize atomic energy hazards remains constant and nondiscretionary.97 Alternatively, Congress could have enacted the 1946
Atomic Energy Act" without taking responsibility for public
health and safety. Congress again had the opportunity to curtail or
modify this responsibility in 1954 yet it failed to do so." The final
version of the 1954 AEA demonstrates that Congress chose to reaffirm its objective legal duty to protect public health by minimizing
atomic energy hazards.10 0
This nondiscretionary duty which devolves upon the NRC, 101
differs from the agency's responsibility to regulate nuclear power.
The latter task requires technical expertise in the development
and production of devices utilizing nuclear energy.' For example,
some of the subjects within the purview of this latter category are:
emergency core cooling systems, 0 s atomic devices for the produc92. Id. See notes 71, 72, 84 supra and accompanying text.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d)-(e) (1976) arose from the duty Congress felt to protect the public
health and safety by minimizing the hazards of radiation. This duty is severable from the
NRC's discretionary regulatory functions as enumerated in subsequent AEA chapters. See
notes 62, 68, 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 70 supra.
96. See note 77 supra.
97. The case law involving nuclear power does not foreclose this argument since the
courts never stated that the NRC does not have a nondiscretionary duty to protect the
public health and safety, but rather the courts have determined that in suits contesting the
NRC's regulatory activities, the agency's actions are discretionary. See notes 59, 60 supra.
98. See note 70 supra.
99. See note 77 supra.
100. See notes 53, 84 supra.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d)-(e) (1976) and section V infra. See also notes 93-96 supra
and accompanying text.
102. See notes 57, 59 supra and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
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tion or utilization of special nuclear material, 10 4 nuclear fuel cycle
hazards, 10 5 provisions for nuclear research, 08 rules and regulations
governing licenses and licensees, 0 7 plant siting alternatives,0 8 and
construction permits.'0 " The NRC's decisions pertaining to these
technical planning and regulatory functions, which include setting
radiation standards," 0 require the agency to balance the health
and safety risks to the public with the present state of technology
and the need to develop nuclear power for the benefit of the general welfare."'
Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1973).
104. See, e.g., Cotter Corp. v. Seaborg, 370 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1966); Nuclear Data, Inc.
v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 344 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
105. See, e.g., Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
106. See, e.g., Bramer v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 569 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Crowther v.
Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).
107. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 571
F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978); Citizens For Safe Power, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 524
F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
108. See, e:g., New England Coalition v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87 (1st
Cir. 1978).
109. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.
1976).
110. See notes 102-09 supra and accompanying text and notes 111, 112 infra.
111. The weighing [of residual risks against the benefits of the reactor] requires a
value judgment as well as a measuring, and thus the standards are not scientific numbers below which no danger exists. The value judgment embodies complex social and
political considerations, for atomic energy has a potential that suggests unlimited
benefits to entire nations and presents a risk to entire populations of people, and
perhaps their progeny.
Citizens for Safe Power v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 524 F.2d 1291, 1296 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1975). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 557-58 (1978); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1231 (D. Colo.
1970). But see New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1969).
As a precondition to the grant of a license for operation of a nuclear facility, the
Atomic Energy Act, explicitly requires a Commission finding that the licensed facility
will afford 'adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.' The Commission has long interpreted this provision as a demand for 'reasonable assurance' of that
protection....
Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citation
omitted). See 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1976); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396,
406-16 (1961); York Committee for a Safe Environment v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 527
F.2d 812, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Citizens For Safe Power, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
524 F.2d 1291, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 499 F.2d 1069, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946, 954-55
(D.D.C. 1973). For discussion on the "reasonable assurances" analysis see Yellin, Judicial
Review and Nuclear Power: Assessing the Risks of Environmental Catastrophe, 45 GEO.
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The nondiscretionary protective duty to the public that arises
when the NRC becomes aware of radiological emissions during a
nuclear accident, on the other hand, does not involve the agency's
planning and regulatory considerations. 12 The agency's nondiscretionary duty applies to the consequences of these decisions. " '
Moreover, requiring the NRC to issue a health warning will both
alert the segment of the public exposed to the radiation of the fact
that they are or may be' 14 subject to an increased risk of health
injury and allow the generation of nuclear power to continue, "
thereby benefiting the general welfare.
Furthermore, if the court decides that the NRC's protective duty
is reviewable, " a it need not defer to the agency's expertise" 7 in
WASH. L.J. 969 (1979); Comment, The Energy Crisis: "Reasonable Assurances" of Safety in

the Regulation of Nuclear Power Facilities,55 J. URB. L. 371 (1978). See generally Krause,
supra note 1, at 83.

112. See note 111 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 113, 122 infra and
accompanying text.
113. The fact that the NRC has regulated a plant and set radiation safety standards
does not foreclose the possibility of health hazards arising from actual radiation emissions.
See note 32 supra. This possibility exists even though the radiation dose may be less than a
particular standard. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979),
the court found that, since the employee was contaminated in her home, the private radiation standard should apply. Therefore, the jury was proper in returning a verdict against
Kerr-McGee Corp. on the theories of strict liability and negligence. The court stated: "Although her body burden [the employee's radiation exposure] constituted approximately onefourth of that permitted by regulation for a radiation worker during her lifetime, it exceeded
by two and a half times the exposure permitted to any member of the public [under normal
circumstances]." Id. at 583. Likewise, the possible health hazards associated with the accrual and aggravating effects of low-level radiation, see note 32 supra, may occur at levels
below which the Commission will order an evacuation. See THE COMMISSION'S REPORT,
supra note 21, at 13, 38-42.
114. The plaintiffs in Johnsruddid not seek a shutdown or deratement of a plant as did
plaintiffs in other suits. See Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Tenn. 1979). See note 122 infra.
115. See note 32 supra and note 122 infra.
116. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
117. " 'Primary jurisdiction' . . . applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its views." United States v. Western Pac. R.R.,
352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956) (citation omitted). See Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp 414, 419
(M.D. Tenn. 1979).
[T]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction would require that the court stay its hand until
the agency charged by Congress with the responsibility of regulating the subject matter has had an opportunity to apply its expertise.
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determining if a health hazard exists because this is not a question
as to which the agency's technical knowledge is determinative:
when there is a nuclear accident the technical methodology and
data that the NRC previously used in planning or operating a nuclear power plant or device is not in issue.' 1 8 The pertinent question is whether the public must be informed" 9 of the health
120
hazards associated with accidental low-level radiation emissions,
particularly when there are monitoring deficiencies' 21 during the
incident. This question requires an objective weighing by a court of
the various views on the health effects of low-level radiation. 122 To

The plaintiff in this case requested the NRC to revoke licenses of all nuclear fuel
facilities within the jurisdiction of the Commission because 'nuclear power production
activities sanctioned by defendants pose an unavoidable health hazard.'
Id. at 416-17. But see Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1228 (D. Colo. 1970) (where
the court did not defer to the agency under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction: "The question that we must resolve . . . is whether or not the evidence establishes that the plans for
the release and flaring of the gas are inadequate to provide a reasonably certain and rational
basis for predicting that no danger to health and safety will result therefrom.").
118. At least, the NRC's previous method and data are not in issue when the plaintiffs
request a health warning and do not allege that the NRC improperly planned or regulated
the plant. See notes 60, 111, 112, 117 supra and accompanying text and note 122 infra.
119. See notes 32, 52, 112 supra and accompanying text and notes 122, 168 infra and
accompanying text.
120. Id.
121. See note 32 supra.
122. See notes 32, 52, 112 supra and notes 165, 168 infra. If it is determined that there
is a possibility of or a potential threat to public health, then by analogy to Reserve Mining
Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified on appeal,
529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976), a court may order the NRC to issue a warning because such
relief does not challenge the government's nuclear power program, see note 111 supra, nor
the NRC's regulatory functions by requesting a shutdown or deratement of the plant. Nader
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F.
Supp. 414 (M.D. Tenn. 1979). See also note 71 supra and accompanying text.
In Reserve Mining, the Eighth Circuit held that the taconite company's asbestos discharges into the air and water gave rise to a potential threat to the public health which was
of sufficient gravity to be legally cognizable to call for an abatement order. The court stated
"[A]lthough Reserve's discharges represent a-medical danger, they have not in this case
been proven to amount to a health hazard. The discharges may or may not result in detrimental health effects, but, for the present that is simply unknown." Reserve Mining v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d at 506 (quoting Reserve Mining Co. v. United
States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974)). Therefore, the Eighth Circuit determined that
an injunction to close the plant could not be justified when unpredictable health effects
were balanced against the clearly predictable social and economic consequences that would
follow if the plant were closed. Id. at 536. See Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513
F.2d at 1055-56; Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. at 419-21. However, because the exis-
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defer to an agency would be to accept an agency's decision without
evaluating that decision within the context of other opinions.12 s
tence of the asbestos contaminant in air and water gave rise to a reasonable medical concern
for the public health-the contaminant created some health risk-then "the existence of
this risk to the public justifies an injunctive decree requiring abatement of the health hazard
on reasonable terms as a precautionary and preventive measure to protect the public
health." Reserve Mining v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d at 520. A warning to
the residents of TMI that they have or may have an increased risk of health injury, see note
32 supra, would be similar to Reserve Mining's abatement order in that no social or economic consequences to the nuclear power industry or general welfare would flow from the
request. See also Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d at 1045 (the court upheld
the AEC's order denying a petition seeking a shutdown or derating of twenty nuclear power
plants); Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. at 419 (the court remanded the proceeding to the
NRC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction after the plaintiff requested the NRC to
revoke licenses of all nuclear fuel facilities within the jurisdiction of the commission). See
notes 113, 115, 116, 117 supra and accompanying text.
For other cases supporting the view that the possibility of a health hazard requires precautionary measures, see Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 483-84 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (the industries required four years to switch to a two-fiber asbestos standard but "in
order to insure that the employees handle materials likely to produce asbestos dust carefully
and to prevent persons from entering areas where they will be exposed to such dust needlessly, cautionary labels and warning signs" were required); Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1082, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("In short, we think the Cigarette
Labeling Act represents the balance drawn between the narrow purpose of warning the
public 'that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health' and the interests of the economy .. ").In 1969, after more conclusive evidence established the risk, the government
switched the warning to read "The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health." Larus & Brother Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 447 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 1971).
123. While giving his speech on Radiological Hazards in War and Peace (103 CONG.
REC. 10569 (1957)), Representative Holifield made the following statement during his discussion on man-made radiological dangers:
The Atomic Energy Commission has continually given out assurances that we had
nothing to worry about and yet, we find, using testimony from their own experts that
there is no reason to worry. ...
It has been my experience that a Congressional investigation is often the only way
to make the Atomic Energy Commission come out into the open. We literally squeeze
the information out of the Agency. Except for the Congressional hearings, the AEC
would withhold some important information that the public should have. ...
Id. at 10572. See notes 26, 42, 47, 49 supra and accompanying text.
It was not until 25 years after this report, when Jaffee alleged that because of his exposure
to radiation from an atomic blast he developed inoperable cancer, that the Jaffee court took
judicial notice of the dangers of radiation from nuclear detonation and held that soldiers
ordered to be present at the 1953 blast while on military duty were entitled to a health
warning. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d at 720.
It would be unfortunate if the Johnsrud plaintiffs had to wait 25 years before a court
would entertain the request for a health warning, particularly when there is uncertainty as
to the health effects caused by low-level radiation emissions as there was uncertainty in
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In light of the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that, when

there is a radiological accident in a nuclear power plant which
jeopardizes public health and safety, the NRC has the discretion to
determine the technical alternatives124 that will rectify the problem. In addition, however, when the NRC becomes aware that
there were radiological emissions, it also has the nondiscretionary
duty to minimize the effects of the radiological hazard on the public health and safety. 125 Corrective measures may serve to lessen
the potential seriousness of the accident, but they will not mini-

mize the impact of the radiation emissions already released on the
public. A reliable warning l26 on which the exposed individuals can
1954 concerning the hazards associated with atomic blasting. See 103 CONG. REC. 10569
(1957) (RadiationHazards in War and Peace, remarks by Rep. Holifield). See also notes
32, 122 supra and notes 125, 168 infra.
Representative Holifield closed his speech by saying:
We stand on the threshold of an era of nuclear power. This new power source, if it
is to play any significant role in filling the energy needs of the world, will unleash
amounts of radioactivity even more staggering than those involved in nuclear weaponry. It makes no difference whether the split uranium atom is born inside a bomb
or nuclear power reactor. If it is uncontrolled and enters man's environment, it forms
the same ultimate hazard.
103 CONG. REc. 10573 (1957) (Radiation Hazards in War and Peace, remarks by Rep.
Holifield.) Representative Holifield then urged scientists to discuss radiation hazards and
set standards. Id. However, given the divergence of scientific opinion on radiation hazards,
discussions as to standards for radiation exposure are still premature. See note 32 supra.
124. See notes 70, 71 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 32, 71, 72, 88 supra and accompanying text. Additionally, the need to
warn arises after the occurrence of an event which the NRC had the discretion to control. In
Jaffee, the Third Circuit stated "[t]here are two 'agency actions' that Jaffee asks this court
to review.., second, the Government's failure, in the years since the [atomic] explosion, to
give medical warning. . .

."

592 F.2d at 719. During the course of determining that the

agency action could be reviewed the Jaffee court, without explanation, stated "We need not
decide whether military orders given to soldiers by superior officers are committed to agency
discretion or otherwise beyond judicial review." Id. at 719 n.16. The court's statement is
subject to the interpretation that while the military order is discretionary, if the outcome of
the order is detrimental then a nondiscretionary duty to warn arises. This interpretation is
supported by the Third Circuit's finding that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not applicable to the claims presented in Jalee. Id. See note 165 infra.
Although Jaffee concerned the government's failure to warn for many years, while cases
similiar to Johnsrud concern the immediate failure to warn, the underlying principle appears to be the same. The discretion an agency has over its delegated functions does not
apply to detrimental incidents that result from those functions and which are within the
agency's knowledge. See notes 122-23 supra.
126. See notes 43-47, 122 supra and accompanying text. See generally notes 32, 52, 112,
123 supra and note 168 infra.
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make informed decisions 12 7 would serve this latter nondiscretionary duty.
V.

Judicial Review of the NRC: District Court or
Appellate Court?

Other than the agency discretion exception to the APA's general provision for judicial review, a particular statute governing an
agency may also 128 preclude review. Although the NRC is subject
127. See notes 32, 52, 124 supra and accompanying text and note 168 infra and accompanying text.
128. See note 18 supra. It is not within the scope of this Comment to discuss whether
plaintiffs who request a health warning after having been subject to radiation emissions
have standing to sue. Suffice it to say that with the liberalized standing requirements under
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), it is likely that a court will find that plaintiffs have standing. See
United States v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).
Moreover, the ripeness doctrine should not affect a court's decision. The two policy objectives underlying the ripeness doctrine are: avoiding premature adjudications which could
embroil the courts in abstract debates over administrative policies; and protecting the agencies from judicial intervention before administrative decisions are formalized and felt in a
concrete way by the affected parties. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
See Black v. Beame, 419 F. Supp. 599, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("In general, a controversy over
an agency's action or inaction is deemed ripe for adjudication if (1) it presents legal issues
fit for resolution, and (2) the action or inaction of the agency has a 'direct and immediate
impact' on the plaintiffs.")
If a court finds that the NRC has a non-discretionary duty to warn of radiation emissions,
particularly when there are monitoring deficiencies, and the NRC doesn't issue this warning,
an adjudication by a court as to the propriety of injunctive relief will not be premature since
the NRC will have breached its duty to the public. Furthermore, a court's adjudication will
not interfere with the agency's determinations if the NRC's duty to warn is nondiscretionary. See discussion in section IV supra.
If, as an alternative to finding that the NRC has a nondiscretionary duty to warn, a court
finds that the plaintiffs' federal constitutional and common law rights have been violated by
the agency's failure to warn, then the court's decision will neither be premature nor interfere with an agency's determination. However, in this latter instance, a court may postpone
judicial review to ensure that the NRC's decision whether to warn has been formalized. See
Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1950, slip op. at 3.
In addition to standing and ripeness questions, a court must determine whether the
NRC's failure to warn constitutes agency action reviewable under the APA. It seems that it
does. Section 551, Title 5, United States Code supports this proposition. Section 551 states:
" agency action' includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1976) (emphasis added). If a court finds that the NRC violated a nondiscretionary duty by failing to
issue a health warning, then it is almost certain that a court will find the agency's inaction
to constitute action under the APA. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428
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to judicial review under the Atomic Energy Act,1" 9 an ancillary
problem arises 30 because the NRC is subject to both nonstatutory
review in a district court and statutory review in a court of appeals. 3 1 Therefore, in order to avoid seeking review in the wrong
court, a plaintiff must initially decide whether the subject matter
of his or her suit mandates appellate review.1 2 This decision is
necessary because non-statutory review in the district court is
available only in the absence of a specific statute authorizing review in a particular court. 8 "
Whether a suit requesting the NRC to issue a health warning in
the event of a nuclear accident requires statutory review by the
court of appeals depends on whether it is a "proceeding for the
issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the
activities of licensees" found in section 2239, Title 42, United
F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[w]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same
impact on the rights of the parties as a denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial
review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order
denying relief."); Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133, 1141 (7th
Cir. 1970). But see Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
On the other hand, if a court finds that the plaintiff's constitutional and common law rights
have been violated by the NRC's failure to warn, without deciding whether the NRC has
such a nondiscretionary duty, then the court can determine that the agency's delay in issuing a warning is a final and reviewable action. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). Again, as with the
ripeness doctrine, a court may postpone review to ensure that the NRC decision to warn has
been formalized. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976). Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d
856, 865 (4th Cir 1961) ("Delay so long as it continues and so long as there is any vestige of
a right which will suffer further impairment by an extension of the delay, may not be final
in the usual sense of that word, but when it amounts to a violation of section 6 (a) of the
APA and to a legal wrong within the meaning of section 10(a) of that Act, it is final action ..
"). See also Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 720 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979).
129. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2231, 2239, 2342 (1976). The provisions for judicial review remain
unaffected by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 301(g), 88 Stat.
1233. See note 53 supra.
130. See Note, Jurisdictionto Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or
Court of Appeals, 88 HARv. L. REv. 980 (1975).
131. See notes 18, 20, 35, 37 supra.
132. See Gage v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 479 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Honicker
v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Concerned Citizens of Rhode Island v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 458 F. Supp. 627 (D.R.I. 1977); Paskavitch v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 458 F. Supp. 216 (D. Conn. 1978); Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C.
1973); Izaak Walton League of America v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D.D.C. 1971).
See also notes 35, 39 supra.
133. See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976).
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States Code ("section 2239").184 This determination in turn, hinges
on whether Congress intended section 2239 to apply only to the
NRC's direct procedures with licensees or to include NRC actions
that may have an indirect impact on the manner in which the
agency regulates its licensees. 185
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976). See also note 20 supra.
135. See Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). "There is great
contrariety among administrative agencies created by Congress as respects 'the extent to
which, and the procedures by which, different measures of control afford judicial review of
administrative action.' . . . The answer of course, depends on the particular enactment
under which review is sought. It turns on 'the existence of courts and the intent of Congress
as deduced from the statutes and precedents.' "Id. at 156 (citations omitted). See also Elmo
Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
If a court determines that NRC actions that may have an indirect impact on the manner
in which the agency regulates its licensees are subject to § 2239, Title 42, of the United
States Code then one could argue for district court jurisdiction based on the fact that the
NRC's failure to warn is not a final order arising out of an agency proceeding. See Writers
Guild of America, West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1079
(C.D. Cal. 1976) ("At the very least the term 'order' [under the Administrative Orders Review Act] implies a formal agency mandate issued at the culmination of some regular agency
proceeding. . . . Here the plaintiffs complain of informal actions of the Commission not
entered of record, not served upon the parties, and taken wholly outside agency proceedings.") Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (1978), however, a plaintiff can petition the NRC for
emergency relief by bringing an enforcement proceeding which allows any person to request
the institution of a proceeding under § 2.202 "to modify, suspend or revoke a license, or for
such other action as may be proper." (emphasis added). Any decision the NRC makes
under 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 is a final order. Cf. Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. 414, 417
(M.D. Tenn. 1979). Thus, if a court finds that NRC actions which may indirectly affect the
agency's regulation of licensees come within the purview of § 2239, then it follows that the
court will interpret 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (1978) broadly.
If a court decides that the exhaustion doctrine, see note 165 infra, does not apply to such
cases as Johnsrud, then even if the action were found to be within the scope of § 2239, it
would not be a final order arising out of an agency proceeding. See Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 423 F. Supp. at 1079. The NRC's
failure to warn, however, would be a final agency action because a court's decision would not
interfere with an agency's determinations. Further, there is no adequate remedy in other
courts; exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required and the action is not an appealable final order. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Pepsico, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 472 F.2d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 1972); Nor-Am Agricultural
Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 1970); Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v.
Dixon, 348 F.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856,
865 (4th Cir. 1961). See also note 18 supra. Compare Note, Jurisdictionto Review Federal
Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 980, 988
(1975) ("final orders" should be construed to include all agency actions that are not barred
by the doctrine of finality) with Ecology Action v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 492 F.2d 998 (2d
Cir. 1974); Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 433 F.2d 524
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
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The 1946 AEA' 6 simply provides that the APA shall be applicable to any AEC agency action.' 1 7 Therefore, the 1946 AEA did not
exempt any suit from district court review. In 1954, the Senate's
preliminary amendments to the 1946 Act'3 8 included a more thorough chapter on judicial review and administrative procedures.'" 9
The Senate's subheading to this chapter describes it as applying to
procedures and conditions for issuing licenses.140 Section 181 of
this chapter incorporates, among other things, the APA provision
found in the 1946 Act.'" Sections 182 through 188 contain specific
information pertaining to licenses and provisions for dealing with
14
licensees and construction permits. '
Section 189 then provides for judicial review of a final order entered in "certain agency actions.' 4 s This proposal is the first evidence of Congress' intent to exempt certain AEC suits from dis136. Pub. L. No. 585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976)).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976). The APA provides for nonstatutory review in the district
court. See notes 37-38 supra.
138. S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 3456.
139. Id. at 3483. "Chapter 16, Jurisdictional Review and Administrative Procedure." Id.
140. Id. "This chapter describes the procedures and conditions for issuing licenses under
the bill." Id.
141. See note 137 supra. S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3483. Section 181 makes the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act applicable to all agency actions of the Commission. Where publication of
data involved in agency action is contrary to the national security and common defense,
then identical secret procedures are required to be set up within the Commission. The Commission is required to grant a hearing to any party materially interested in any agency action. Id.
142. Id. at 3483-84. Section 182 sets forth the information that the Commission may
require in any application for a license so as to assure the Commission of adequate information on which to fulfill its obligations to protect the common defense and to protect the
health and safety of the public. Id. at 3483. Section 183 provides that the licenses shall
include certain terms. Id. at 3483-84. Section 184 provides requirements concerning the
transfer, assignment, or disposition of licenses. Id. at 3484. Section 185 governs the issuance
of construction permits. Id. Section 186 governs revocation of licenses. Id. Section 187 requires that all licenses shall be subject to amendment, revision, or modification by amendments to the act or by action of the Commission. Id. Section 188 permits the Commission,
under certain circumstances, "to continue the operation of a facility whose licenses are revoked. . . ." Id.
143. Id. at 3484. Section 189 provides for judicial review of a final order of the Commission entered in certain agency actions. Id. See H.R. 5487, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 Stat. 1129
(1950) (which provides in part that "[t]he court of appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of all final
orders of [various administrative agencies]."). See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
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trict court review. It is reasonable to conclude that section 189
applies only to the sections which directly precede it because: 1)
section 181 already provides for general review of agency actions;
and 2) as a matter of construction section 189 comes after the
technical sections. Thus, the inference to be drawn is that section
181 encompasses nonstatutory review under the APA of any
agency actions other than those arising out of sections 182 through
188.144
Arguably since this proposed chapter on judicial review and administrative procedures includes a narrowly worded subheading
which mentions procedures and conditions for issuing licenses,14,
sections 181 and 189 could apply only to licensing actions. Therefore, in the absence of any provision for judicial review of other
agency actions such review is precluded. If a limited construction
of both sections is adopted, however, then a presumption of judicial review of all agency actions not embraced by sections 181
through 189 would exist. Moreover, the proposed act contains no
specific exclusion and no "clear and convincing" showing of a con1 46
gressional intent to preclude such judicial review.
The interpretation that section 189 applies specifically to sections 182 through 188 while section 181 applies to all other agency
147
action is further bolstered by the final draft of the 1954 AEA.
144. See notes 138, 143 supra.
145. See note 140 supra.
146. The general rule is that administrative action is subject to judicial review;
nonreviewability must be shown by a specific exclusion on the face of a statute or by a clear

and convincing showing of congressional intent to preclude judicial review before courts will
cut off an aggrieved party's right to be heard. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975); Citizens
Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949

(1970); Fry Roofing Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 415 F. Supp.
799 (W.D. Mo.), afl'd, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1976); City Wide Coalition Against Childhood
Lead Paint Poisoning v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 356 F. Supp. 123, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
See also H.R. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Ses. (1941). If there is no showing that Congress sought

to prohibit judicial review of agency actions not falling within the purview of sections 182
through 189, then such review in the district court can be presumed. See Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Paramount Farms, Inc. v. Morton, 527 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir.
1975); Hunt v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975); City of Camden v. Plotkin, 466 F.
Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1978).
147. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2096 (1976)).
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This draft includes all of the sections proposed
by the Senate " "
4
'
subheading.
but omits the Senate's restrictive
Furthermore, the final version of section 181, a "general" provision, provides that the APA applies to all AEC agency action.'"
Section 189 of the 1954 Act,' 6 ' not only follows the technical sections pertaining to licenses, licensees and permits, 52 but also specifies in part that it applies:
fiun any proceeding. . . for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction permit, or application to transfer control,
and in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees, and in any proceeding for the
15 3
payment of compensation, an award or royalties.

The recently codified versions of sections 181 and 189 of the
1954 AEA are section 2231, Title 42, United States Code ("section
2231") "'' and section 2239166 respectively. These codifications do

not differ substantially from their counterparts in the 1954 Act.
This fact demonstrates that since judicial review of agency action
has been provided for under section 2231, then section 2239 should
be restricted to the subjects specifically listed under it. As a result,
NRC actions that have no immediate effect on the agency's licensing and inspection of licensees or enforcement of rules regulating

them ""' fall within the purview of section 2231 and are therefore
148. Id. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, §§ 181-189, 68 Stat. 953-56.
See notes 142-44 supra.
149. See note 140 supra.
150. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2096 (1976).
151. Id. § 189. The final version of § 189 is more specific than the Senate's original
proposal. See 100 Cong. Rec. 10686 (1954) (remarks of Reps. Hickenlooper and Pastore).
See also notes 138, 143 supra.
152. See notes 41-42 supra. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 is preceded by § 2232 applying to License
applications; § 2233, Terms of licenses; § 2234, Inalienability of licenses; § 2235, Construction permits; § 2236, Revocation of Licenses; § 2237, Modification of License; and § 2238,
Continued operation of facilities.
153. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703 § 189, 68 Stat. 955-56 (1954).
154. See note 20 supra.
155. Id.
156. THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 21, at 19. There may be a contrary result if
the complaint in an action requesting a health warning was framed in such a manner as to
have the NRC mandate to licensees the duty to issue a warning upon notice of a nuclear
power accident. Such an action would then be infringing on the NRC's enforcement
activities.
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157
reviewable by a district court.

An examination of the case law in this area also supports a narrow interpretation of section 2239. A majority of the cases reviewed by the courts of appeal involving either the NRC or AEC
concern license applications or revocations, siting and design of nuclear power plants.15 The district court cases, on the other hand,
deal with nondiscretionary legal questions pertaining to the agencies '19 or with subjects other than procedures for licenses, licensees, construction permits, compensation, or patents.1 60
A restrictive interpretation of section 2239 is also supported by
the different policies behind nonstatutory and statutory review.
The emphasis in nonstatutory suits in district courts is upon assuring individuals access to a judicial forum to seek redress against
the government and its agencies and officials in an effort to preserve-their federal legal rights. 6 ' The primary policies behind stat157. See Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 144; Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v.
Dixon, 348 F.2d at 344.
158. See New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978); Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978); Citizens For Safe Power, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Gage v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Honicker v.
Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. 414 (M.D: Tenn. 1979); Paskavitch v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
458 F. Supp. 216 (D. Conn. 1978); Concerned Citizens of Rhode Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 430 F. Supp. 627 (D.R.I. 1977); Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1973).
159. See Izaak Walton League of America v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.D.C.
1971). The district court in Izaak Walton held that only the court of appeals had jurisdiction over a court seeking review of certain regulations but it took jurisdiction over the second count alleging a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1976). The court stated:
[P]laintiffs are not requesting review of the granting or denying of a license. They
request this Court to direct the AEC to comply with a specific statutory mandate. In
this regard the Court does have jurisdiction to consider the issues presented, namely,
whether there has been a violation of a clear, nondiscretionary, legal duty.
Id. at 291. Cf. Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. 414, 418 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), Concerned
Citizens of Rhode Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 430 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D.R.I.
1977); Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946, 954 (D.D.C. 1973).
160. See Drake v. Detroit Edison Co., 443 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Mich. 1976); Crowther v.
Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970). Cf. Concerned Citizens of Rhode Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 430 F. Supp. 627 (D.R.I. 1977) (the agency action complained of
was not a final order and therefore the court of appeals did not have exclusive jurisdiction).
But see Ecology Action v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 492 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974) (the agency
action complained of was not a final order and therefore the court of appeals dismissed it
for lack of jurisdiction).
161. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG
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utory review in the courts of appeal are, first, a legislative confidence in a court that has acquired more substantive and
procedural expertise in areas of administrative law and, second, a
need to expedite the implementation of agency programs by reduc-

ing delays associated with judicial review.162
For example, the emphasis in an action requesting a health
warning in the event of a nuclear accident is on the claim that residents living near a nuclear power plant have been deprived of
their federal constitutional, statutory and common law rights1 s by
unknowingly being subject to irreparable harm caused by radiation

emissions.'" Thus, such an action contains the policies for nonstatutory review because the individuals are seeking to vindicate their

federal legal rights allegedly violated by the government. 1 " The
& AD. NEws, 6126, 6130 6138, 6139. Nonstatutory suits against the United States were utilized to avoid the doctrine of sovereign immunity and to facilitate review-"to provide judicial review to individuals claiming that the Government has harmed or threatens to harm
them" Id. at 1626. See Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1950, slip op. at 5 n.6; Jaffee v. United
States, 592 F.2d at 719 n.12. L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 356
(1965) ("Statutes authorizing review in the district court may reflect concern to make review
more easily available.").
162. See Note, Jurisdictionto Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or
Court of Appeals, 88 HARv. L. Rv. 980, 983 (1975).
163. Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1950, slip op. at 5 n.6.
164. Id. See also note 32 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 161 supra; Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d at 720. Although the Department of Defense is subject to judicial review under section 1331 only in nonstatutory suits,
the court's emphasis in Jaffee is on the government's failure to warn the soldiers of the
dangers of radiation from nuclear detonation and not on the army's power to order the
soldiers to be present near the blast. Id. at 718-20. Similarly, the Johnsrud plaintiffs are
suing the government for its failure to warn the Three Mile Island residents of the increased
risk to their health caused by the additional radiation from the TMI 2 nuclear power plant
to the natural background radiation. The plaintiffs are not suing an agency for relief based
on its faulty operations at Three Mile Island. Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1950, (3d Cir., Apr.
23, 1980). See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text.
In contrast to Jaffee and Johnsrud, the plaintiffs in Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp.
414 (M.D. Tenn 1979), sought to revoke licenses of all nuclear fuel cycle facilities within the
Commission's jurisdiction on the grounds that the defendant's licensing of such facilities
allegedly deprived plaintiff of life without due process and failed to assure adequate protection of public health and safety in violation of the Atomic Energy Act, Title 42 of the
Uniied States Code. While the plaintiffs brought the action to vindicate an alleged violation
of their federal constitutional and statutory rights, the relief sought directly interfered with
the NRC's licensing, inspection and enforcement activities. Therefore, even if they had exhausted their administrative remedies, the suit was subject to judicial review in the court of
appeals. Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. at 417-18.
A court will invoke the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies when a claim is
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substantive or procedural experience of the court of appeals is relacognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency. See United States v. Western
Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 959 (1956).
However, if the court decides that the NRC has a nondiscretionary legal duty to warn the
public, then the exhaustion doctrine will not apply because an action requesting such a
warning will present a question of law which is cognizable in the district court even in the
absence of exhaustion. See Drake v. Detroit Edison Co., 443 F. Supp. 833, 836-837 (D. Mich.
1978); Izzak Walton League of America v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.D.C. 1971).
But see Casey v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 578 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978). See also section IV
supra. Moreover, regardless of whether the plaintiffs could petition the agency, the doctrine
of exhaustion has no application in this case because:
a) It would result in irreparable harm. Administrative remedies are inadequate because
time is crucial to the protection of substantive rights and such remedies would involve delay. United States v. 249.12 Acres of Land, 414 F. Supp. 933, 935 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Lyons
v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See notes 32, 128, 136 supra and
accompanying test.
b) Bypassing an administrative procedure in this instance will not seriously impair the
ability of an agency to perform its functions. See Ecology Center v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860,
866 (5th Cir. 1975). The plaintiffs request a public health warning. They do not seek to
interfere with the NRC's licensing and enforcement functions. See notes 112, 113 supra and
accompanying text. See also Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d at 719.
c) Exhaustion is not necessary because the administrative remedy under consideration is
futile. See Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. at 418. In order to issue a proper health warning the NRC would have to acknowledge that the residents living near a nuclear plant bear
an increased risk to their health. See note 32 supra and accompany text. Based on the fact
that the NRC did not acknowledge these health risks in its report on Three Mile Island, it is
doubtful that the agency would now change its position. See INVESTIGATIONS INTO TMI,
supra note 24, at 24. Cf. Colorado v. Veterans Administration, 430 F. Supp. 551, 552 (D.
Colo. 1977), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 663 (1980) ("Exhaustion ... is not required when it
seems clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant agency will not grant the relief in
question.")
d) The matter involved does not require particular agency expertise. See Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal.
1976). See section IV supra and note 168 infra.
e) Exhaustion will not be required where a nonfrivolous claim is made that the agency's
action will result in a deprivation of constitutional rights. This aspect of the exhaustion
doctrine will have effect if the court decides that plaintiffs such as those in Johnsrud have
had their federal constitutional rights violated by the NRC's inaction, Johnsrud v. Carter,
No. 79-1950, slip op. at 5-6. See Honicker v. Hendrie, 465 F. Supp. at 414-17.
f) The courts are in a more objective position to decide whether radiation emissions have
caused an increased risk of health injury to the public. See Writers Guild of America, West,
Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 423 F. Supp. at 108 (no need to exhaust administrative remedies when the agency is biased). Therefore, the need for the NRC to develop a
factual record, Scanwell Labs. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), should be overshadowed by the importance of an initial review by the district court of the agency's failure to
warn.
g) It is not likely that the judiciary will be overburdened with suits stemming from the
same administrative failure because nuclear power accidents are infrequent. See Ecology
Center v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860, 866 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tively unimportant in such an action'"6 because the decision to issue a health warning essentially requires an objective analysis of

the various views on the effects of low level radiation. 1 7 Both
courts are equally qualified to analyze such views.1 8
Initial review in the court of appeals may expedite the issuance
of a health warning.1 69 However, the proper development of the le-

gal issues 7

involved in a suit of this type is more likely if the

district court first resolves such issues with a view towards the posh) The role of administrative autonomy has no significance in an action requesting a
health warning. See Ecology Center v. Coleman, 515 F.2d at 866; section IV and note 128
supra.
i) Furthermore, in Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d at 719 n.16, the court stated that "the
doctrine of administrative exhaustion has no application to this case." Id. The Third Circuit
did not give a reason for its decision. However, due to the similarities in Jaffee and such
cases as Johnsrud, it would be appropriate if the court held that the doctrine of exhaustion
did not apply to such latter cases.
166. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
167. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
168. In Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d at 720, the Third Circuit took judicial notice
that the dangers of radiation from nuclear detonation are a matter of public knowledge.
Although more time has elapsed for the health dangers from nuclear detonations to be explored and publicized, than it has for the dangers from low level radiation, the fact remains
that the Jaffee court must have based its decision to take judicial notice on available
sources concerning the subject. Such a decision is especially important because proof of causation in radiation injury suits is difficult. See Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823
(E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1963); Gregg v. United States, 186 F. Supp.
44 (E.D.S.C. 1960); Bulloch v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956). Thus, arguably the increased risk to health caused by low level radiation (or at least, the uncertainty
surrounding dangers of low level radiation) can be judicially noted based on the various
materials available on the subject. See note 32 supra.
169. But see Johnsrud v. Carter, No. 79-1185 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 1979); Johnsrud v.
Carter, No. 79-1950, slip op at 3. See generally notes 32, 52 supra.
170. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 587
F.2d 549, 557 (2d Cir. 1978)
The benefits which result from a system in which issues of law are resolved first by a
district court and then by the Courts of Appeals are well-known particularly to the
judges on the Courts of Appeals ....
Thus, we are not inclined to favor an expansive
construction of our own exclusive jurisdiction, because to do so would deprive us of
the wisdom and sound judgment which district judges apply to questions we are
eventually called upon to review ....
Id. at 557.
By the same token, once the court of appeals takes jurisdiction over a case presenting a
question of law, it has the power in the interest of justice to reach the merits of the suit
regardless of the fact that the district court is the proper forum. See id. at 557-58. See also
Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1970); Pepsico, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972).
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sibility of a review by an appellate court.171 The legislative history
and case law under the AEA, along with an analysis of the policy
differences between nonstatutory and special statutory review,
demonstrate that a suit requesting the NRC to issue a health
warning should be reviewed in the district court. This conclusion is
buttressed by the assertion that the NRC has a nondiscretionary
legal duty to minimize the effects of radiation hazards on the public health and safety. 17 2 Such a request comes within the purview
of section 2231, which provides that the APA applies to AEC
agency actions and as a result is subject to district court review; it
does not have an immediate effect on the agency's licensing and
inspection of licensees or enforcement of rules governing them and
therefore should not be reviewed by the court of appeals pursuant
to section 2239.
VI.

Conclusion

It is submitted that when the NRC becomes aware of radiological emissions resulting from a nuclear power accident, it has the
nondiscretionary duty to minimize the effects of this hazard on the
public health and safety. As a minimum precautionary measure, a
reliable warning on which the individuals exposed to radiation can
make informed decisions would fullfill this duty.
The direct legal duty of the NRC to the public requires an objective weighing by the court of the various views on the health
effects of low-level radiation. The failure to warn violates rights
granted to all individuals by the Atomic Energy Act and possibly
federal constitutional and common law rights as well. Therefore,
failure of the NRC to comply with its nondiscretionary duty to
warn will be subject to unrestrained nonstatutory judicial review in
the district court.
Valerie Acerra

171. See Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (suggesting concurrent jurisdiction to review administrative inaction).
172. See section IV supra.

